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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
public playgrounds. 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed., 1928)
sec. 2860; 19 R. C. L. 1129.
In view of the tendency of recent decisions the rule is developing to charge
the city with a duty of care in maintaining parks, playgrounds, and like
recreation centers. See McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1932 Supp.)
sec. 2859. At least, the city should be held responsible when a child is in-
jured in a playground or swimming pool. To hold otherwise is to establish
a rule of law which puts children at the mercy of dangerous conditions of
which they are not aware and over which they have no control, a result which
Paraska v. City of Scranton, supra, decides is not consonant with justice.
H. A. G., '35.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR-EXTENSION TO ELECTRICAL APPLIANEs.-The plain-
tiff, a country girl about nineteen years of age, went into the beauty shop of
the defendant and there ordered her first permanent wave. She was con-
ducted to the rear of the shop and after a shampoo her hair was wound up
on spindles and the current applied. She complained that the spindles
pulled her hair and later that her head was being burnt, but the attendants
declined to take action, assuring her that the curler could neither pull nor
burn. A day later she found her head severely burnt and blistered, causing
her intense pain for a month, and impairing her capacity to hear. Held:
The case is within the limits of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Glossip v.
Kelly (Mo. App. 1934) 67 S. W. (2d) 513.
The case seems to be in line with the prevailing view. The injury, ac-
cording to human experience, would not have been sustained unless there
was some imperfection in the instrument or negligence on the part of the
operator. The defendant's agents were in sole control and the plaintiff had
no way of telling what special negligence caused the injury. However,
the case marks an extension of the doctrine by the Missouri courts. There
are several general classes of cases in which the rule is applicable: (1) where
passengers are injured in a railroad wreck, McGoffln v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.
(1891) 102 Mo. 540, 15 S. W. 76; Knox v. Missouri K. and T. Ry. Co. et al.
(1918) 199 Mo. App. 64, 203 S. W. 225; (2) where persons are injured by an
explosion of powder or dynamite. Holman v. Clark (1917) 272 Mo. 266, 198
S. W. 868; (3) where a person is injured by a falling object. McClosky v.
Koplar (1932) 329 Mo. 527, 46 S. W. (2d) 557; (4) where persons are
shocked or electrocuted by defective wires, telephones or other instruments,
Grady v. Louisiana Light, Power and Traction Co. (Mo. App. 1923) 253
S. W. 202; Joyce v. Missouri and Kansas Telephone Co. (Mo. App. 1918) 211
S. W. 900; Sprinkles v. Missouri Public Utilities Co. (Mo. App. 1916) 183
S. W. 1072. There is doubt whether the rule can be invoked today in the
case of injury from escaping gas, steam or water. The prevailing view in
America is that it does apply in the case of escaping gas, and early Missouri
cases held to the same effect. Sipple v. Laclede Gas Light Co. (1907)
125 Mo. App. 81, 102 S. W. 608. But later cases overruled this stand.
Brauer v. St. Louis County Gas Co. (Mo. App. 1922) 238 S. W. 519; Rede v.
St. Louis County Gas Co. (Mo. App. 1923) 254 S. W. 415. The situation
was complicated in Streck v. St. Louis County Gas Co. (Mo. App. 1933) 58
S. W. (2d) 487, where the plaintiff's gas supply was shut off, causing the
stove flame to be put out and then was turned on again, causing him injury.
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The plaintiff relied on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, and the Supreme Court
in affirming judgment for the plaintiff held that the doctrine did not apply,
but that the plaintiff had proved negligence by circumstantial evidence, a
fine distinction. Where injury has been sustained in automobile cases the
doctrine has a limited application. And where a person underwent surgical,
medical, dental or beauty treatment and suffered injury the courts have not
applied the doctrine.
The Missouri courts have held that the doctrine would not apply where an
anaesthetizing machine exploded, Wilt v. Mcullum (1923) 214 Mo. App.
321, 253 S. W. 156; where the plaintiff's jaw was dislocated during a tooth
extraction, Hill v. Jackson (1924) 218 Mo. App. 210, 265 S. W. 859; and
that death caused by anaesthetizing was insufficient to create the presump-
tion, Spaire v. Burch (Mo. App. 1913) 154 S. W. 172. The courts in these
circumstances create a distinction between standardized devices which are
safe, and new, complicated machines, where injury could easily happen with-
out negligence.
As the Tes ipsa loquitur doctrine is applied in Missouri since the case of
McClosky v. Koplar (1932) 329 Mo. 527, 46 S. W. (2d) 557, now creating
only a rebuttable presumption, it works no great hardship on the defendant.
It should be applied in cases such as the principal one, the justification for
such extension being that where all signs point to the guilt of the defendant,
an injured party should not be denied redress merely because circumstances
combine to prevent his knowing exactly what particular defect or negligence
caused the injury. J. D. Y., '36.
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